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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following: residents of Smalltown, Virginia, a community transitioning away from coal production and toward green
fuels, become interested in educating their neighboring cities and
counties about the environmental benefits of sustainable energy
production.1 Familiar with national nonprofit groups founded to
educate the public on environmental causes and green energy,
Smalltowners run a quick internet search and discover that no such
organizations exist in their corner of the Commonwealth.2 Thus, at
a local government meeting, the Smalltowners decide to create their
own educational, charitable organization to teach their peers about
the environmental benefits of sustainable fuels and to raise funds
for those impacted by coal-related health conditions.
Pro bono Smalltown Lawyer recommends that the Smalltowners
create an entity under Virginia law and has Smalltown Paralegal
file articles of incorporation to form a nonstock corporation.3 After
official formation of the new organization, Smalltown Charity applies for and receives federal tax-exempt status from the Internal
Revenue Service under section 501(c)(3) by virtue of the group’s
charitable and educational mission.4 Smalltown Charity promptly
1. This premise is hypothesized from the transition away from coal production happening
across the Appalachian region of the United States. See Abby Neal, Issue Brief: How Coal
Country Can Adapt to the Energy Transition, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/issue-brief-how-coal-country-can-adapt-to-the-energytransition [https://perma.cc/UEY3-JY57] (describing general framework of transition from coal
to renewable energy in America).
2. See, e.g., Mission & History, ACORE: AM. COUNCIL ON RENEWABLE ENERGY (2021),
https://acore.org/mission-history/ [https://perma.cc/7T5T-R9Q9].
3. See Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-800 to -945 (2020)
(establishing procedure for forming nonstock corporation); see also FAQs - Virginia Nonstock
Corporations (Including Nonprofits), STATE CORP. COMM’N (2021), https://www.scc.virginia.
gov/pages/Virginia-Nonstock-Corporations-FAQs [https://perma.cc/73E8-DVEQ] (explaining
that under Virginia law, nonstock corporations are often formed for “non-profit purposes, such
as ... charitable organizations”).
4. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Note that the process for applying for federal tax-exemption under
section 501(c)(3) has been substantially simplified with the introduction of IRS Form 1023-EZ,
Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption. As such, obtaining tax-exemption is
often feasible without legal assistance. See Streamlined Application for Recognition of
Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, IRS (June 7, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-1023-ez [https://perma.cc/6LH4-PBCQ].
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begins soliciting and receiving donations from Virginians and soon
produces a series of environmental education videos that go viral
online with a creative hashtag.5 Smalltown Charity receives a tidal
wave of interested donors from Virginia who are beyond eager to
support the group’s cause. Unconvinced that Smalltown Charity’s
popularity will continue and unable to purchase expensive recordkeeping systems, the Smalltowners’ cause remains an all-volunteer
operation with donation information recorded in basic software.6
One year after the viral campaign, Smalltown Charity receives an
email from Bigtown Donor demanding that Charity delete any
information it has on file about him and alleging that Charity has
failed to gain his consent for using his information in targeted
educational mailing materials.7 Donor claims that a new Virginia
data privacy law gives him rights to these actions and requires
Charity to set up sophisticated processing systems to constantly
monitor donor information.8 Smalltown Charity finds the new law
online and rushes to contact Smalltown Lawyer to interpret the
statute. Lawyer declines to provide additional pro bono services,
leaving Charity’s volunteers to interpret the legalese of a 6,000word statute on their own.9
Through the volunteers’ informal research, Charity discovers that
new, similar data privacy measures have also been passed in California, Colorado, and the European Union.10 Smalltown volunteers
5. See, e.g., Brian Frederick, Ice Bucket Challenge Dramatically Accelerated the Fight
Against ALS, ALS ASS’N (June 4, 2019), https://www.als.org/stories-news/ice-bucket-challengedramatically-accelerated-fight-against-als [https://perma.cc/D8JT-W3LZ] (example of viral
nonprofit educational and marketing campaign).
6. See Brice S. McKeever, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2018: Public Charities, Giving,
and Volunteering, THE URBAN INST. (Nov. 2018), https://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofitsector-brief-2018#the-nonprofit-sector-in-brief-2018-public-charities-giving-and-volunteering
[https://perma.cc/72SP-ZCP6] (noting “over two-fifths of public charities rely on volunteers”).
7. It is common for tax-exempt and other nonprofit organizations to use donor demographic data in creating effective solicitation materials. See, e.g., Industries-Non-Profit &
Charity, SPECTRUM MKTG. COS. (2021), https://spectrummarketing.com/industries/non-profitdirect-mail/ [https://perma.cc/9U5S-FNMS] (providing example of marketing firm providing
data-driven direct mail services to nonprofits).
8. See Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA), VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-575 to
-585 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) for the measure alluded to in this scenario.
9. See id.
10. See California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-.199.100
(West 2023) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Colorado Privacy Act (CPA), 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445,
3448 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-1301 to -1313) (effective July 1, 2023);
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skim the Charity’s records and discover that the Charity has received donations from donors in all three of these jurisdictions.
Mistakenly believing that the receipt of a singular donation is a
sufficient trigger for requiring compliance with each of these measures, Smalltown Charity scrambles to upgrade its software and
takes out loans to retain a data protection firm and a privacy
attorney from neighboring Bigtown. Eventually, Smalltown Charity
is forced into bankruptcy, driven out of operation by the sky-high
compliance costs incurred by an inaccurate reading of complex
privacy statutes.11
This scenario highlights the two most significant challenges posed
by the emerging patchwork of consumer privacy and data protection statutes to nonprofit organizations. First, nonprofit organizations—particularly 501(c)(3) tax-exempt groups—uniquely rely on
personal data in the form of donations to power their budgets and
their programs and thus are uniquely overburdened by statutes
that demand overhauls to internal personal data processing systems.12 501(c)(3) charitable and educational organizations are
sustained by the dollars of their donors, dollars that are processed
alongside personal information that is, in turn, used for targeted

Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, The Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU)
[hereinafter GDPR].
11. While this scenario is dramatized, the compliance costs for a tax-exempt organization
seeking to conform with any one of these measures can be astronomical. For example, a data
review conducted by cybersecurity and privacy publication CPO Magazine found that 34
percent of small- and mid-sized organizations spent between $100,000 and $499,000 on
complying with the GDPR. Notably, the Magazine concluded that “[o]nly 6% of all organizations spent less than $50,000.” Nicole Lindsey, Understanding the GDPR Cost of Continuous Compliance, CPO MAG. (May 31, 2019), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/
understanding-the-gdpr-cost-of-continuous-compliance/ [https://perma.cc/H6H5-XQAF]. When
considering that nearly 40 percent of section 501(c)(3)-exempt organizations filing with IRS
for fiscal year 2018 reported $500,000 or fewer in assets—and that nearly 15 percent reported
an asset value under $100,000—privacy compliance costs can easily drive tax-exempt organizations out of operation. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 990 RETURNS OF 501(C)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS: BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS, BY ASSET SIZE, TAX YEAR
2018 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-exempt-organi
zations-statistics [https://perma.cc/AWT6-UCBJ].
12. For 501(c)(3) organizations reporting under $500,000 in assets for FY2018, roughly
53 percent of revenue came from contributions, gifts, and grants. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., supra note 11.
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programming.13 Second, the costs of compliance relative to income
are higher for tax-exempt organizations by virtue of their limited
budgets and personnel resources.14 These costs are applicable to
organizations that incorrectly conclude compliance is required as
well as organizations that accurately assess their compliance
obligations.15
Perhaps in recognition of these difficulties, select enacted data
privacy protection measures explicitly exempt 501(c)(3) organizations from compliance.16 The European Union’s GDPR requires
compliance from any entities that process the “personal data” of
individuals located in the EU, with “personal data” broadly defined
as “any information relating to an ... identifiable natural person.”17
The GDPR does not distinguish between data captured for for-profit
purposes versus data used in nonprofit ventures.18 By contrast,
California’s CCPA generally applies only to for-profit entities but
can capture nonprofits in the compliance net depending on the
details of their business relationships with for-profit entities, such
as sharing corporate branding.19 Colorado’s CPA measure mirrors
the GDPR in failing to exempt any nonprofits from compliance,20
while Virginia’s VCDPA exempts only Virginia-formed nonstock
13. See id.; see also SPECTRUM MKTG. COS., supra note 7; Donating to Charity, USAGOV
(2021), https://www.usa.gov/donate-to-charity [https://perma.cc/4RFG-NDKU] (noting that
donors are often able to take federal tax deductions for donations to 501(c)(3) organizations).
The ability to claim a deduction makes donation to a recognized 501(c)(3) organization more
appealing when compared to other classifications of nonprofit or tax-exempt organizations.
14. Compliance costs for tax-exempts in this space come in two flavors. The first captures
upfront costs associated with determining if compliance is even required. Smalltown Charity
was unable to withstand this cost, leading to Charity’s reliance on lay volunteers who
incorrectly interpreted lengthy statutes and prompting unnecessary spending under the color
of compliance. The second includes ongoing, genuine compliance costs associated with maintaining the systems and protocols required under the various measures. See, e.g., Lindsey,
supra note 11.
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (defining “nonprofit organization” to include
organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and stating that the provisions of the VCDPA
“shall not apply to any ... nonprofit organization”). But see COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(2)
(effective July 1, 2023) (exempting certain entities such as healthcare facilities and airlines
from compliance with the CPA but failing to exempt any classifications of nonprofit organizations).
17. GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 4(1).
18. See id. at art. 2(1)-(4).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(2) (West 2023).
20. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(2).
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corporations and Internal Revenue Service (IRS)-classified 501(c)(3)
organizations.21
This confusing patchwork of state and international measures,
coupled with the internet-age phenomenon of even tiny organizations processing data from donors around the globe, presents
501(c)(3) groups with a Morton’s fork: either to risk bankruptcy by
expending the massive monetary and temporal resources necessary
to determine compliance and overhaul internal systems or to do
nothing and risk disciplinary action for failure to comply with any
one of these measures.22 Both types of risk carry heightened societal
consequences as both endanger organizational bankruptcy. As a
public policy matter, 501(c)(3) classification exists on the theory that
(c)(3) organizations offer societal benefits so significant that the government is willing to subsidize said organizations’ operations by
virtue of federal tax-exemption.23 Simultaneously, widespread
compliance with some set of consumer data privacy standards is
crucial for vindicating the individual privacy interest central to
existing data privacy law.24
Preferably, then, the optimal consumer data privacy scheme is
one that would balance the interests of individual consumers in
controlling their personal information online against the collective,
societal interest of 501(c)(3) organizations’ continued operation.25
The ideal arrangement would also eliminate the confusing patchwork system of disparate, single-jurisdiction measures currently in
place in favor of a uniform, singular standard operative nationwide.26
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-576.
22. See supra notes 11-21 and accompanying text.
23. See Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It “Charitable” to Discriminate?: The Necessary
Transformation of Section 501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV.
45, 86 (2007) (stating that “[c]haritable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt
entity confers a public benefit—a benefit which the society or the community may not itself
choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of public institutions” (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92 (1983))).
24. See, e.g., Stuart L. Pardau, The California Consumer Privacy Act: Towards a
European-Style Privacy Regime in the United States?, 23 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 68, 83 (2018)
(noting, in a discussion of privacy law in the United States and Europe, that the “European
focus has traditionally been first and foremost on individual privacy protection as a basic
human right” (internal quotations and citation omitted)).
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part III.
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How does such an ideal system emerge? This Note argues that
Congress should use its Commerce Clause power to pass a consumer
data privacy measure that (1) preempts state law and (2) explicitly
exempts 501(c)(3) organizations from compliance.27 Such preemptive action with a narrow 501(c)(3) carve-out would avoid the
potential harm of exempting too broad a group of nonprofit entities
while ensuring charitable organizations’ continued existence, would
be more protective of both the individual privacy right and 501(c)(3)
existence than merely adjusting the revenue dollar threshold at
which entities must comply, and would properly balance the individual right to control personal data with the societal good served
by the existence of 501(c)(3) charitable organizations.28
Part I of this Note elaborates on the relationship between
501(c)(3) organizations and personal data and expands on the
compliance difficulties faced by (and the collective societal good of)
(c)(3) groups. Part II reviews the four major existing privacy law
measures—the GDPR, the CCPA, the CPA, and the VCDPA—and
analyzes the scope of each measure’s reach as it pertains to 501(c)(3)
charities. Part III of this Note makes the case for federal preemptory action in a sweeping consumer privacy rights measure that
trumps the existing patchwork of state law and exempts 501(c)(3)
organizations from compliance. Finally, Part IV of this Note considers and responds to potential Tenth Amendment and state
expertise counterarguments that could be raised in opposition to
federal preemptory action in this arena.
I. 501(C)(3) DATA USE BACKGROUND
An overview of the centrality of data to 501(c)(3) organizations’
operations is necessary to ground the discussion in Parts II, III, and
IV of this Note.
For-profit businesses, especially those with expansive online
presences, often have entire revenue and expense streams dedicated
to the purchase and sale of consumer data.29 The rise of “big data”
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part III.
29. See Benefits of Big Data: Increased Revenues and Reduced Costs, BUS. APPLICATION
RSCH. CTR. (2019), https://bi-survey.com/big-data-benefits [https://perma.cc/XF4N-Q5K7] (de-
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is no doubt a market-wide phenomenon,30 yet 501(c)(3) organizations’ use of and reliance on consumer data differs meaningfully
from that of their for-profit counterparts. First, charitable organizations must collect personal data—often copious amounts of it—
because they are funded predominantly by natural-person donations.31 Second, 501(c)(3) exempt organizations’ programmatic
activities often utilize donor and member data for successful
operations.32 Consumer data is used to solicit new donors, to identify
potential new members to join the organization, to target possible
volunteers, to direct communications and programs towards those
most likely to participate, and to coordinate activities with related
and like-minded organizations.33 By virtue of their tax-exempt
classification, 501(c)(3) organizations often have “people” at the
heart of their exempt purpose: two central permissible purposes
under section 501(c)(3) are charitable and educational missions,

scribing results from big data use study and concluding big data is responsible for 8 percent
increase in revenue and 10 percent reduction in costs for for-profit entities worldwide, with
a key benefit found in “a better understanding of customers”).
30. See id.
31. This reliance on donor-consumer data is driven by IRS regulations surrounding section
501(c)(3) exemption. To maintain exempt status under (c)(3), an entity must typically demonstrate that it meets the “public support test,” see 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-9(f)(4)(v) (2020), a
regulatory standard that requires 501(c)(3) organizations to show they have a wide variety
of funding from “public” sources (namely, natural persons and other public charities). See id.
§ 1.170A-9(f)(3)(iii)(B). This test has slight variations depending on the subclassification
sought by the (c)(3) entity, but broadly speaking, organizations must demonstrate a public
support percentage of at least 33.3 percent over a five-year cumulative basis to continue to
receive federal tax-exemption. See id. § 1.170A-9(f)(1)(ii). Importantly, certain big-dollar
donations are excluded from this calculation, requiring charities to seek out a variety of
donors rather than rely on a few high-net-worth supporters. See id. § 1.170A-9(f)(3)(iii)(B). In
other words, IRS regulations effectively force charitable and educational organizations to
collect massive amounts of consumer data to survive. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (defining
category of 501(c)(3) organizations subject to public support requirements); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.170A-9(f)(1)-(3) (detailing one-third public support calculation and limitations on big-dollar
donations); see also Ely R. Levy & Normal I. Silber, Nonprofit Fundraising and Consumer
Protection: A Donor’s Right to Privacy, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 519, 528-29 (2004) (stating
“almost all” nonprofit donations, subscriptions, communications, and service requests “leave
behind ... [an] electronic record,” making the nonprofit sector’s data presence “no less
sophisticated and complex than the commercial one”).
32. See Levy & Silber, supra note 31, at 528.
33. See id. at 528, 535.
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broad categories that implicate assistance to, and programs for,
individuals.34
Because exempt charitable organizations are forced to seek a
diverse donor base by virtue of Internal Revenue Service regulations
and are similarly confined to a narrow set of permissible purposes
in their operations, the nature of the 501(c)(3) exemption is one that
demands a continuous intake and use of consumer data.35
II. COMPLEXITY OF EXISTING PATCHWORK SYSTEM
The landscape of consumer data privacy measures is dominated
by individual jurisdictions’ attempts at drafting and instituting
consumer-protective schemes that sweep beyond the jurisdictions’
own borders.36 Each consumer data privacy law37 defines personal
data and covered entities differently and provides for a wide range
of enforcement actions in the event of a compliance shortcoming or
failure.38

34. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (defining exempt purposes for which an entity must be organized
and operated to be granted federal tax exemption under the section). Note that the IRS
describes “charitable” as including relief to “the poor, the distressed, or the underprivileged,”
the elimination of “prejudice and discrimination,” and the defense of “human and civil rights.”
Exempt Purposes—Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), IRS (Sept. 7, 2021),
https://www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/exempt-purposes-internalrevenue-code-section-501c3 [https://perma.cc/8BEN-B4YX]. The people-centric nature of these
permissible purposes is evident.
35. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 3(1)-(3) (establishing that the measure “applies
to the processing of personal data ... regardless of whether the processing takes place in the
[European] Union or not”).
37. This Note only considers enacted, comprehensive consumer data privacy measures in
existence as of February 2022, which does not include the since-enacted Utah Consumer
Privacy Act (signed into law March 24, 2022) or Connecticut’s Act Concerning Personal Data
Privacy and Online Monitoring (signed into law May 10, 2022). See 2022 Utah Laws 462
(effective Dec. 31, 2023); 2022 Conn. Acts 22-15 (Reg. Sess.) (effective July 1, 2023). While
numerous category-specific data privacy measures exist beyond the European scheme and
three state-level comprehensive measures highlighted here, these laws are often focused on
one subset of consumer data and are not as relevant to 501(c)(3) groups. See, e.g., Biometric
Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1-14/99 (2008).
38. Compare, e.g., GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 4(1) (defining “personal data” to mean
“any information relating to an ... identifiable natural person”), with, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2023) (defining “personal information” as “information that identifies,
relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be
linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer”).
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To illustrate the difficulty of good-faith compliance with all
applicable measures, this Section compares four key elements of
each existing comprehensive consumer data privacy measure: the
definition of personal data or information, the scope of applicability
relative to 501(c)(3) organizations, what full compliance with the
measure demands, and the enforcement mechanisms and consequences provided for compliance failures.
A. Existing Comprehensive Consumer Privacy Measures
Four major consumer data privacy laws have implications for
501(c)(3) organizations: the European Union’s General Data
Protection Regulation, California’s Consumer Privacy Act, Colorado’s Privacy Act, and Virginia’s Consumer Data Privacy Act.39
While the 117th Congress has introduced a sweeping federal
measure, the Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2021, that
would preempt state law in this area, the bill has failed to gain
traction in either chamber.40
1. European Union General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR was adopted in April 201641 and went into effect in
May 2018.42 The GDPR defines personal data incredibly broadly as
“any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person.”43 This definition is understood to include not only biographical information about natural persons, such as names, addresses,
and birthdates, but also data such as “log-in information, IP
39. See supra notes 8 and 10. Again, this discussion exempts the Utah Consumer Privacy
Act and Connecticut’s Act Concerning Personal Data Privacy and Online Monitoring, which
were enacted after this Note’s writing. See supra note 37.
40. Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2021 (CDPSA), S. 1494, 117th Cong.
(2021). Notably, § 2(4)(A)(ii)(III) of the draft bill explicitly includes nonprofit organizations as
entities required to comply with the proposal. S. 1494 § 2(4)(A)(ii)(III). Thus, the bill takes the
opposite position of the one taken by this Note.
41. The History of the General Data Protection Regulation, EUR. DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR
(2022), https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/legislation/history-general-dataprotection-regulation_en [https://perma.cc/GSW5-6E43].
42. Directorate-General for Communication, Data Protection in the EU, EUR. COMM’N
(2021), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en [https://
perma.cc/KT7Y-N9AP].
43. GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
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addresses, and vehicle identification numbers,” because these
details enable indirect identification of natural persons.44
The GDPR applies to organizations involved in controlling or
processing the personal data of individuals located within the
European Union, with “processing” broadly defined to capture any
operation performed on personal data (either individually or in
sets).45 Crucially, these definitions are explicitly expanded by specific territorial provisions outlined in Article 3 of the GDPR.46 Article
3 establishes that the regulation applies to all processing of personal
data of “subjects who are in the [European] Union” by an entity not
in the European Union when the data processing activities are
related to the offering of goods or services to individuals in the EU,
even if the goods or services are offered free of charge (such as those
of a tax-exempt organization).47
For a 501(c)(3) organization, then, determining if the organization’s web presence, online programming, or other operations constitute the “offering” of goods and services to a European Union
member state is critically important.48 The GDPR makes clear that
mere website access within the Union is insufficient to demonstrate
that an entity is actively offering goods and services to EU data
subjects, but beyond this bright line, the measure is murky.49 The
GDPR suggests a multifactor assessment to determine if an organization is indeed offering goods or services to the European Union,
which considers, among other elements, the organization’s use of the
language or currency of a member state and if the organization
mentions EU customers.50

44. Caroline Krass, Alexander H. Southwell, Ahmed Baladi, Emanuelle Bartoli, James
A. Cox, Michael Walther, Ryan T. Bergsieker & Jason N. Kleinwaks, The General Data Protection Regulation: A Primer for U.S.-Based Organizations That Handle EU Personal Data,
GIBSON DUNN (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-general-data-protection-regu
lation-a-primer-for-u-s-based-organizations-that-handle-eu-personal-data/ [https://perma.cc/
Z7KP-XCH5] (noting that, due to definitional breadth, “in practice, most services and/or projects will be considered to involve processing of personal data”).
45. GDPR, supra note 10, at art. 4(2).
46. Id. at art. 3(1)-(3).
47. Id. at art. 3(2)(a).
48. See id. at reg. (23).
49. See id.
50. Id.
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The GDPR’s compliance requirements are extensive and largely
depend on whether a covered actor is classified as a “controller” of
personal data, a “processor” of personal data, or both.51 Covered
organizations that are determined to “offer goods or services” to the
Union “must designate [an official] representative to the European
Union in writing.”52 Additional duties of “controllers,” defined as
businesses that determine the means and purposes of personal data
processing, include lengthy transparency requirements and a responsibility to ensure the legality of every stage of the data
processing scheme.53 In practice, this controller liability “can only be
achieved by way of complete documentation” that is quite burdensome to covered entities.54 Controllers must also meet breach
notification standards and conduct periodic data protection impact
assessments depending on the nature of the data-related activity at
hand.55
Member states of the European Union are granted broad enforcement powers under the GDPR, including investigative rights
and the ability to impose administrative fines for infringements.56
These fines can be substantial, with a maximum penalty of €20
million or 4 percent of an offender’s annual revenue, whichever is
higher.57 European regulators have not been shy about enforcement,
issuing fines as large as €50 million over the first four years the
measure has been in effect.58 Given the average budgets of 501(c)(3)

51. See Manuel Klar, Binding Effects of the European General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) on U.S. Companies, 11 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 101, 141-43 (2020). The breadth
of the GDPR’s compliance obligations is also a product of the breadth of the consumer rights
granted under the measure. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Towards a Global
Data Privacy Standard, 71 FLA. L. REV. 365, 365 (2019) (summarizing key GDPR-granted
consumer rights as a right to access data, a right to portability, a right to be forgotten, and
a right to know if data has been hacked).
52. See Klar, supra note 51, at 142.
53. See id. at 144-46.
54. Id. at 150-53.
55. Id. at 151-53.
56. GDPR, supra note 10, at arts. 58, 83.
57. See id. at art. 83(4)-(5).
58. See Three Years of GDPR: The Biggest Fines So Far, BBC (May 24, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-57011639 [https://perma.cc/4CQX-ECXD] (describing
significant fines issued over first three years of GDPR operation).

2022]

PROTECTING THE CHARITIES

241

organizations, it is obvious that a fine of this size would drive an
organization out of business.59
In short, the GDPR is deliberately designed to capture a huge
range of for- and nonprofit entities that process the personal data of
those within the European Union and carries a hefty deterrence
element in the form of threatened multi-million-euro penalties.60 As
most tax-exempt organizations could be classified as their own
“controllers” of data (assuming the preconditions of offering goods
or services to EU member states are met), compliance with the
GDPR represents a huge and potentially ruinous barrier to Smalltown Charity-esque organizations.61
2. California Consumer Privacy Act
The California Consumer Privacy Act, passed in June 2018 and
effective January 2020, was the United States’ first exposure to a
domestic, GDPR-style, comprehensive privacy measure.62 Almost
immediately, the CCPA earned comparisons to the GDPR and was
regarded as the most sweeping privacy law in the United States.63
Given the oversized reach of California’s economy—both relative to
the rest of the United States and to the remainder of the globe—the
CCPA attracted immediate attention as a privacy measure in a

59. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 41-57 and accompanying text.
61. See supra Introduction. Note that this discussion of the GDPR is provided solely as
background for the American variations on the European approach to comprehensive privacy
measures. This Note is not focused on detailing American charities’ compliance under the
GDPR.
62. See Joshua A. Jessen, Benjamin B. Wagner, Christina Chandler Kogan, Abbey A.
Barrera & Alison Watkins, California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, GIBSON DUNN (July 12,
2018), https://www.gibsondunn.com/california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/ [https://perma.cc/
326A-L5BF]. Note that the CCPA has already been amended multiple times since its enactment, mostly for technical adjustments and the extension of regulatory-related deadlines. See
generally CCPA-/CPRA-Related Legislation Tracker, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS. (Feb. 27, 2022),
https://iapp.org/resources/article/ccpa-cpra-related-legislation-tracker/ [https://perma.cc/7H54BT6W] (cataloging ongoing amendments to the CCPA).
63. See, e.g., Jessen et al., supra note 62 (introducing the CCPA as being “not as strict as
the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),” but still “more stringent than
most privacy laws in the United States”).

242

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:229

jurisdiction in which American entities were very likely to be
active.64
Like the GDPR, the CCPA’s definition of personal data (termed
“personal information” in the statute) is exceptionally broad. The
Act describes personal information as information that not only
directly identifies a particular consumer, but also as information
that “relates to, describes, [or] is reasonably capable of being
associated with” a specific individual, even if indirectly.65 Among
other categories of covered data, the CCPA notes that names,
physical addresses, online usernames, email addresses, internet
browsing history, professional or employment history, and “[i]nferences drawn from any of the information identified ... to create a
profile about a ... consumer’s preferences” are all definitively
considered personal information.66
The CCPA applies to businesses that meet specific data processing or revenue-based thresholds outlined in the text.67 Because the
California Act defines “business” to mean entities that are organized or operated for profit, 501(c)(3) organizations are generally not
required to comply with the CCPA’s prescriptions.68 However,
entities that are controlled by for-profit businesses or that share
corporate branding may be captured under the CCPA.69 With the
rise in corporate foundations and fundraising mechanisms such as
commercial co-venture campaigns, the CCPA could capture
California-operating 501(c)(3) organizations that have close relationships with a controlling for-profit entity.70
64. See Best States for Business 2019, California, FORBES (2019), https://www.forbes.com/
places/ca/ [https://perma.cc/W2D9-3MVW] (noting California’s economy represents 15 percent
of the United States’ and would rank as the fifth biggest in the world if it were an
independent country).
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1) (West 2023).
66. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(A)-(K).
67. Id. § 1798.140(c)(1)-(2).
68. See id.
69. Id. § 1798.140(c)(2) (defining business to also include “[a]ny entity that controls or is
controlled by a business ... and that shares common branding with the business”).
70. Id. For a description of commercial co-ventures, sometimes termed “cause marketing,”
see Commercial Co-Ventures and Cause Marketing, HARBOR COMPLIANCE (May 18, 2022),
https://www.harborcompliance.com/information/commercial-co-ventures-and-cause-marketing
[https://perma.cc/5QBV-ACBM]; see also Commercial Co-Ventures and Cause-Related Marketing, NAT’L COUNCIL OF NONPROFITS, https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/tools-resources/
commercial-co-ventures-and-cause-related-marketing [https://perma.cc/Z744-M3ZW].
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California’s Act centers on providing consumers with rights
related to how and why their personal data is used.71 As indicated
in the original draft legislation, the goal of the CCPA is to ensure
Californians’ rights to (1) know what data is collected and stored by
businesses, (2) learn whether their personal data is sold or shared,
(3) refuse the sale of personal information to third parties, and
(4) access and control their personal data, including a right to delete
said data upon request.72 The obligations imposed on covered
businesses mirror these consumer-oriented aims.73 Among other
responsibilities, CCPA-compliant businesses must utilize elaborate
data-tracking software systems to respond to consumer requests
about the specifics of the personal data a business may hold about
the consumer.74 Covered entities are also required to provide multiple mediums through which a consumer may contact the business
to request their personal information, and businesses must also
institute transparency practices at the point of data collection and
in response to consumer requests for data deletion.75
While the compliance efforts described above may only require
minor adjustments from well-resourced and technology-savvy forprofit organizations, such systems are a far cry from the recordkeeping systems that are used in good faith by the Smalltown
Charities of the world were they to be “captured” by the CCPA’s
narrow coverage of (c)(3)-exempt groups.76 The majority of the
CCPA’s provisions are to be enforced by the Attorney General of
California, who is empowered to seek civil penalties up to $2,500 per
violation of the Act.77 Higher penalties may be sought for intentional
violations.78 Consumers are granted a private right of action only in
response to data breaches, in which case plaintiffs may recover up
to $750 per infraction, or actual damages, whichever is greater.79
71. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100. Significantly, the first section of the statute opens with
a statement of consumer rights granted therein. Id. § 1798.100(a).
72. Assemb. Bill 375, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess., Ch. 55, Sec. 2(i) (Cal. 2018).
73. See generally Jessen et al., supra note 62 (outlining compliance requirements under
CCPA).
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.110(b)-(c).
75. Id. §§ 1798.100, .110.
76. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(b).
78. Id.
79. Id. § 1798.150(a)-(b).
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If the CCPA is California’s response to the GDPR, it sounds more
like an echo than an answer.80 The two measures track very closely
in their scope, reaching beyond the European Union and California
alike to pull foreign entities into the compliance web—and at a cost
when compliance falls short.81
3. Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act
Virginia became the second state to join the consumer data privacy patchwork regime, enacting the Virginia Consumer Data
Protection Act in March 2021 and adding an East Coast flair to an
American legislative arena previously dominated by the Golden
State.82 Though some of the Virginia measure’s language is familiar
to readers of the CCPA, the VCDPA makes meaningful departures
from California’s system and embraces a European-style policy with
a specific exemption for 501(c)(3) organizations.83
Virginia’s law defines “personal data” broadly: any information
that is linked or reasonably connectable to an identified natural
person (or identifiable individual) is considered personal data, with
exemptions for publicly available information and employmentrelated details.84 “Sensitive” data “revealing” a consumer’s racial,
ethnic, religious, health, and/or sexual identities is granted additional protection.85
Unlike the California model (but similar to Colorado’s measure
discussed in Part II.A.4 of this Note), Virginia’s law does not set a
revenue threshold to determine the statute’s applicability.86 Rather,
the Act applies based on an entity’s contacts with Virginia resident80. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
81. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
82. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021); Alexander H. Southwell, Ryan T. Bergsieker,
Cassandra L. Gaedt-Sheckter, Frances A. Waldmann & Lisa V. Zivkovic, Virginia Passes
Comprehensive Privacy Law, GIBSON DUNN (Mar. 8, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/
virginia-passes-comprehensive-privacy-law/ [https://perma.cc/WK45-CV42].
83. Compare supra Part II.A.2 (summarizing California policy), with supra Part II.A.1,
and infra Part II.A.3 (discussing European Union GDPR and Virginia’s privacy measure,
respectively).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575. Information made available to the public via the media is
considered publicly available information not covered by the Act. Id.
85. Id. §§ 59.1-575, -580.
86. Compare supra Part II.A.2 (noting California revenue-based applicability thresholds), with infra Part II.A.4 (discussing Colorado’s lack of monetary threshold).
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consumers, regardless of revenue generated in the Commonwealth
or from processing personal data.87 To be regulated under the
VCDPA, entities must (1) conduct business in Virginia or target
goods or services to residents of the state and (2) control or process
the personal data of at least one hundred thousand Virginians
during a given calendar year.88 Notably, neither “conduct business”
nor “target residents” is defined in the law.89
Significantly, however—and at the heart of this Note—is Virginia’s explicit exemption of nonprofit organizations. The VCDPA
carves out “nonprofit organization[s]” from compliance, which the
statute defines as “any corporation organized under the Virginia
Nonstock Corporation Act or any organization exempt from taxation
under § 501(c)(3) ... of the Internal Revenue Code.”90 In other words,
the Act exempts exactly the type of organization formed by the
Smalltowners in this Note’s introduction: both Virginia-formed
nonprofit organizations and 501(c)(3)-exempt groups are excused
from complying with the VCDPA’s demands.91
The VCDPA grants Virginia consumers access, correction,
deletion, portability, antidiscrimination, opt-out, and business appeal rights.92 As with the regimes reviewed in Parts II.A.1 and
II.A.2, businesses’ obligations under the VCDPA mirror consumer
rights granted: covered organizations must implement extensive
data security practices (including administrative, physical, and
technical safeguards), provide conspicuous means by which consumers may exercise their data rights, and obtain consent for
certain uses of data outside the scope of uses previously disclosed to
Virginians.93 Perhaps the most costly obligation from the GDPR, the
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-576(A).
88. Id. Note that the VCDPA, similar to the CPA, has a second applicability definition
that requires compliance from entities that both process or control the data of twenty-five
thousand Virginians per calendar year and receive at least 50 percent of their gross revenue
from the sale of personal data. Id. As this definition is unlikely to capture 501(c)(3) charitable
organizations, it is not discussed as a comparative point between statutory regimes.
89. See id. § 59.1-575 (failing to include conduct of business or targeting of residents in
definitional section of enacted bill).
90. Id. §§ 59.1-575, -576(B) (citation omitted). Organizations exempt under §§ 501(c)(6)
and 501(c)(12)—trade associations and mutual insurance entities—are also carved out of the
VCDPA. See id. If only the Smalltowners had read the definition recital more carefully!
91. See id.
92. Id. § 59.1-577(A), (C).
93. Id. § 59.1-578(A)(2)-(3), (C).
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conduct of periodic data protection assessments, is also incorporated
into the VCDPA—though the Act does not specify how often these
evaluations must be conducted.94
Enforcement of the VCDPA is delegated to the Virginia Attorney
General, who is empowered to seek injunctions and damages up to
$7,500 per infraction.95 In contrast with California’s provisions, no
private right of action is granted to consumers under Virginia’s
Act.96 This suggests the measure’s efficacy could be subject to the
Commonwealth’s political swings because the Virginia Attorney
General is an elected official with a four-year term.97 The VCDPA
was passed through a Democrat-controlled Virginia General
Assembly and with a Democrat Attorney General in office—a
political reality recently changed with January 2022’s inauguration
of a new Republican Governor and Attorney General.98
Virginia’s Act therefore succeeds in bringing to life the heart of
this Note’s argument: that a comprehensive consumer data privacy
measure should provide an exemption for section 501(c)(3)-exempt
charitable and educational organizations.99 Without this explicit
exemption, it is plain that the demands of the VCDPA would
otherwise be fatal to the Smalltown Charities of the Commonwealth
(at least during administrations that aim to enforce the Act).100
4. Colorado Privacy Act
With its July 2021 passage of the Colorado Privacy Act, the Centennial State joined California and Virginia as the third to protect
94. See id. § 59.1-580(A). Data processing assessments are required only for certain
enumerated processing purposes, such as the use of personal data in targeted advertising. Id.
§ 59.1-580(A)(1).
95. Id. § 59.1-584(A), (C).
96. Compare id. (providing only for Attorney General-led enforcement action), with CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)-(b) (West 2023) (providing private right of action).
97. See VA. CONST. art. 5, § 15 (providing for election of the Attorney General).
98. See Matthew Barakat, Miyares Elected Virginia Attorney General, Denying Herring
a 3rd Term, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/miyareselected-virginia-ag-denies-herring-3rd-term [https://perma.cc/EFF5-A3N2]. Republican Attorneys General may be just as eager to enforce the measure as their Democratic counterparts;
this footnote only highlights the potentially fluid enforcement landscape as the Office of the
Attorney General changes political hands.
99. See infra Part III; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-576(B).
100. See supra Part II.A.3 (describing compliance obligations under Act).

2022]

PROTECTING THE CHARITIES

247

individual privacy rights with GDPR-style legislation.101 While the
Colorado measure parallels its Californian and Virginian predecessors in certain regards, the CPA does not exempt any category of
nonprofit organizations and adopts specific European-style ongoing
compliance obligations as part of its framework.102
In language that echoes the measures previously discussed in this
Note, the CPA defines personal data as information “linked or
reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable individual.”103
The Act explicitly excludes publicly available information from this
definition, permitting entities to process or control data without
CPA applicability if the data is either made available by governmental authorities or is reasonably believed to be made available to
the general public by the consumer.104 A subdefinition of “sensitive
data” controls for the Act’s consent requirements, covering information that “reveal[s] racial or ethnic origin, religious beliefs, a mental
or physical health condition[,] ... sexual orientation, or citizenship”
and data collected about a “known child.”105
The CPA differs from its coastal counterparts in its inclusion of
nonprofit organizations in its compliance net.106 Generally, the Act
applies to any entity that (1) conducts business in Colorado or offers
services that are targeted to Coloradoans, and (2) meets a defined,
quantitative data processing threshold.107 The CPA does not set a
revenue floor for compliance; rather, the measure applies to
organizations that either control or process the personal data of one
hundred thousand or more Coloradoans during a calendar year,

101. See Donald L. Buresh, Should Personal Information and Biometric Data Be Protected
Under a Comprehensive Federal Privacy Statute that Uses the California Consumer Privacy
Act and the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act as Model Laws?, 38 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 39, 73 (2021).
102. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(1) (effective July 1, 2023) (defining applicability of
statute independent of entity’s non- or for-profit status); Buresh, supra note 101, at 73-74.
103. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(17)(a).
104. Id. § 6-1-1303(17)(b).
105. Id. §§ 6-1-1303(24), -1308(7).
106. Compare supra Part II.A.2-3 (discussing CCPA and VCDPA nonprofit exemptions),
with COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(1) (defining applicability of statute).
107. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(1). Note that the statute does not define what constitutes “conducting business,” nor does the Act clarify what “targeted services” entails. See id.
§ 6-1-1303.
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regardless of income derived from that controlling or processing.108
In plain language, the CPA likely captures organizations that continuously interact with Coloradoans, including nonprofit entities
that may be exempted from other states’ privacy regimes.109
Consumers are granted six (rather familiar) rights under the
CPA: the right of access, the right to correct inaccuracies, the right
to deletion, the right of portability, the right to opt-out, and the
right to appeal.110 To effectuate these rights, the CPA requires
covered organizations to adopt security measures for confidentiality,
conduct periodic GDPR-style data protection assessments, collect
only personal data “reasonably necessary” to a disclosed business
purpose, and establish opt-in and opt-out procedures for consumers
to vindicate their consent rights.111
While consumers are not granted a private cause of action to
enforce the CPA, the state’s Attorney General and district attorneys
are empowered to bring suit against noncompliant organizations
that fail to remedy violations within sixty days of notification.112
Though the Act itself does not provide for penalties, violation of it
is considered a deceptive trade practice under Colorado law.113 Each
violation may be subject to a penalty of up to $20,000, with the
Attorney General and district attorneys being granted substantial
discretion for setting fines.114
Of the three state measures examined in Part II of this Note, the
CPA imposes the highest compliance obligation on 501(c)(3)
108. Id. § 6-1-1304(1). Note that the statute has a second applicability definition that
requires compliance from entities that both process or control the data of twenty-five
thousand Colorado residents per calendar year and receive revenue from the sale of personal
data. Id. § 6-1-1304(1)(b)(II). Because this second definition is highly unlikely to capture
501(c)(3) charitable organizations, it is not discussed as a comparative point between statutory regimes.
109. See Ryan Bergsieker, Sarah Erickson, Lisa Zivkovic & Eric Hornbeck, The Colorado
Privacy Act: Enactment of Comprehensive U.S. State Consumer Privacy Laws Continues,
GIBSON DUNN (July 9, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/the-colorado-privacy-act-enact
ment-of-comprehensive-u-s-state-consumer-privacy-laws-continues/ [https://perma.cc/ 9KUEJR5L].
110. Buresh, supra note 101, at 73-74.
111. Bergsieker et al., supra note 109; Buresh, supra note 101, at 74.
112. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1311(1).
113. Id. § 6-1-1311(1)(c).
114. Id. § 6-1-112(1)(a). Note that a violation of any part of the CPA is considered a
separate violation per consumer. Id.
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organizations by failing to exempt any not-for-profit entities.115
Though the Rocky Mountain economy may not match California’s
mammoth scale, charitable organizations with Coloradoan connections may nonetheless be required to overhaul their internal
systems due to the CPA’s unique, revenue-independent applicability
definition.116
B. Federal Preemption Attempts
While states are currently the only American jurisdictions coloring the privacy patchwork, consumer data issues are not far from
the federal government’s mind.117 Most importantly for this Note,
pending before the 117th Congress is a comprehensive, preemptory
consumer data privacy measure that would explicitly include
nonprofit organizations in its compliance web.118 Though the
political reality of the 117th Congress points to a bleak outlook on
the measure’s likelihood of passage (if only due to Washington’s
incessant partisan gridlock), the federal bill is nonetheless informative in providing an example of express preemption of state law in
the consumer data privacy arena.119
The draft CDPSA uses a familiar definition for personal data and
applies broadly to all entities over which the Federal Trade Commission has oversight authority.120 The bill explicitly includes
nonprofit organizations in its coverage, noting that the measure
would empower the Federal Trade Commission to “enforce this Act,
with respect to ... nonprofit organizations ... in the same manner

115. See supra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
116. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1304(1)(a).
117. See Anupam Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy
Law, 105 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1777 (2021) (counting at least ten federal data privacy proposals
that were introduced in 2018 and 2019). But see supra note 37 (acknowledging the newlyenacted Utah and Connecticut comprehensive privacy measures but restricting this Note to
the measures in effect at the time of writing in February 2022).
118. Consumer Data Privacy and Security Act of 2021 (CDPSA), S. 1494, 117th Cong.
§ 2(4)(A)(ii)(III) (including “nonprofit organization[s]” as covered entities under the measure).
119. Id. § 10(a)-(b) (providing for “express preemption of state law”).
120. Id. §§ 2(4)(A), 9(2)(A)-(C) (defining covered entity as any entity over which the Federal
Trade Commission has authority, which generally includes all businesses except financial
institutions and air carriers, and further defining personal data as information that identifies,
is linked, or is easily linkable to a specific individual).
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provided” for enforcement against for-profit organizations.121
“Nonprofit organization” is not separately defined in the draft
measure, though would likely include 501(c)(3) organizations under
a reasonable reading of the term.122
In general, the draft CDPSA inflicts fewer compliance requirements on covered entities than existing state-level measures. The
bill provides consumers with knowledge, access, and erasure rights,
which would require covered businesses to (1) institute clearly
worded and comprehensive privacy policies, (2) develop ongoing
notification systems for policy changes, (3) create portability and
erasure mechanisms, and (4) obtain affirmative consent for most
personal data uses.123 The Federal Trade Commission would be
tasked with enforcement of the measure, though state attorneys
general would also be granted a cause of action in federal court for
violations that uniquely harm their respective states.124 No private
cause of action would exist under the bill as currently drafted.125
Crucially, the CDPSA would provide a singular blanket to replace
the (arguably ineffective, noncomprehensive, and troublesome) existing patchwork: the bill remarks that it is the “express intention
of Congress to promote consistency ... through the establishment of
a uniform Federal privacy framework that preempts ... the authority
of any State or political subdivision of a State.”126 Thus, the pending
Federal Act of 2021 would address the fragmentary nature of existing state-level privacy legislation, but would not remove 501(c)(3)
organizations from its coverage.127

121. Id. § 9(a)(2)(C).
122. See Nonprofit Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A corporation
organized for some purpose other than making a profit, and usu[ally] afforded special tax
treatment.”).
123. S. 1494, §§ 3(a)(1), 4(a), 5(b)-(d).
124. Id. § 9(a)-(b).
125. Id. § 9(d).
126. Id. § 10(a).
127. See supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
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III. A CASE FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTORY ACTION THAT EXEMPTS
501(C)(3)S
There exists little doubt that the federal government—or at least
Congress—understands the need to pass a comprehensive consumer
data privacy measure that preempts state law.128 How, then, should
such a hypothetical privacy measure take shape?
This Part first examines Congress’s Commerce Clause power
under current Supreme Court interpretation to establish that a
comprehensive, preemptory consumer data privacy measure is
within the federal legislature’s power to enact—with or without an
explicit 501(c)(3) organization exemption.129 After establishing the
constitutional groundwork, this Part will focus on normative arguments for an omnibus bill, emphasizing (1) the public policy interest
in the continued existence of 501(c)(3) organizations, (2) the lower
potential of abuse of the exemption by 501(c)(3) groups by virtue of
their Internal Revenue Service-imposed expenditure limitations,
and (3) the need to properly balance the individual privacy right
against a market-wide interest in avoiding mass nonprofit organization bankruptcy.130
A. Commerce Clause Power Permits Congressional Action
Despite the Commerce Clause’s steady growth into the most
expansive of Congress’s granted and enumerated powers, outlining
a constitutional argument for the ability of the federal government
to institute an omnibus consumer data privacy measure is crucial
for legitimizing the hypothetical legislation.
Under current interpretation of the Commerce Clause power,
Congress receives substantial deference in determining that a
128. See Chander et al., supra note 117, at 1777 (noting at least ten omnibus federal
measures in this area have been introduced in 2018-2019 alone).
129. While some academics have simply assumed the Commerce Clause to cover this sort
of legislation, outlining a baseline Commerce Clause argument is necessary to ground the rest
of the discussion. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 902, 922
(2009) (explicitly assuming a federal privacy “omnibus law” is “constitutionally permissible”
given the “scope of the Commerce Clause”).
130. See infra Part III.B.
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regulated area impacts interstate commerce.131 While recent case
law surrounding healthcare measures has somewhat complicated
the Commerce Clause inquiry, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Clause to grant Congress the power to regulate (1) the use of
channels of interstate commerce (such as railroads), (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce (such as individual persons), and
(3) local activities that substantially impact interstate commerce.132
Economic “local activities” receive substantial deference: so long as
there is a rational connection between the activity being regulated
and interstate commerce, the Court’s inquiry ends and the measure
is upheld.133
In the realm of consumer data privacy, Congress has already
drawn explicit connections between its Commerce Clause power
and prior privacy legislation, legislation that has not been reworked
or overruled by the Court.134 While it therefore seems unlikely that
a comprehensive federal consumer data privacy measure would be
challenged for exceeding the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power (given the public and the Court’s amenability to congressional
activity in this area thus far), such a measure would squarely fit
into the Clause’s test outlined above.135
First, there is a colorable argument that the internet is now both
a “channel” and an “instrumentality” of interstate commerce, giving
Congress the ability to regulate transactions that occur online in the
same manner as regulating a railroad or persons moving across
131. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005)
(articulating a “rational basis” standard for review of congressional interstate commerce
regulation).
132. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (defining these three “broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power”).
133. Compare, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255-56, 261-62
(1964) (holding that movement of travelers between states is commercial, economic activity
regulatable by Congress under the Clause and upholding antidiscriminatory public accommodation provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a result), with, e.g., United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14, 627 (2000) (holding that gender-motivated violent
crimes are not economic activity and striking down portion of Violence Against Women Act
as a result).
134. See Patricia L. Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868,
878-79 n.36 (2009) (providing examples of legislation in which Congress has connected its
interstate commerce regulatory capability to consumer privacy; for example, the definition of
“wire communication” in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)).
135. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
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state lines.136 This characterization of the internet would permit
congressional regulation of consumer data privacy without additional review of Congress’s rationale.137
Yet even without classifying the internet as a channel or instrumentality of commerce, Congress indubitably has a rational basis
for concluding that consumer data privacy activity impacts the
interstate marketplace, especially if taken in the aggregate.138 The
nonprofit organization activities implicated by the hypothetical data
privacy measure—soliciting and processing donations, conducting
targeted activity in their communities, and utilizing contributor
data for future marketing—are illustrative of the economic heart of
a consumer data privacy measure.139 Congress could undoubtedly
conclude (and, arguably, already has concluded) that such data
processing and controlling activities, occurring on a borderless
platform like the internet, impact interstate commerce to a degree
that justifies federal preemptory action.140
In short, the case for Congress’s ability to pass a comprehensive
consumer data privacy measure that replaces and preempts state
and local law is effectively airtight. The Constitution’s constraints
should not be considered a barrier to congressional action in this
policy area.141
B. Scope of Measure Would Ensure Constitutionality
Despite the imagined measure’s relatively uncontroversial constitutional basis, the Supreme Court’s recent history of Affordable
Care Act (ACA) litigation illustrates a potential retreat from

136. See, e.g., United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (“As both the
means to engage in commerce and the method by which transactions occur, ‘the Internet is
an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.’”) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added)).
137. See id. (“No additional interstate nexus is required when instrumentalities or channels of interstate commerce are regulated.”).
138. See, e.g., Wickard v. Fillburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (permitting the aggregation
of individual contributions to interstate commerce in which the collective impact is “far from
trivial”).
139. See generally supra Parts I and II.
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part III.A.
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expansive interpretations of the Commerce Clause.142 Of concern to
the ideal consumer data privacy preemptory measure exempting
501(c)(3) organizations is the scepter wielded by the Supreme
Court’s Commerce Clause analysis in National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius.143 Chief Justice Roberts’s majority
held that the ACA’s individual mandate did not regulate existing
commercial activity but rather “compel[led] individuals to become
active in commerce” through the purchase of health insurance.144 In
short, the Chief Justice’s opinion held that what is inherently
noneconomic, and non-regulatable, cannot become economic and
regulatable merely by the stroke of Congress’s pen.145
This argument was forceful enough for the Court to look to Congress’s taxing power to uphold the Act.146 With the now-expanded
conservative majority on the Court, it is not unreasonable to
anticipate heightened scrutiny of novel uses of congressional Commerce Clause power.147 To survive Supreme Court review, then, the
hypothesized preemptive consumer data privacy measure must take
care to avoid regulating what the Supreme Court could interpret as
being noninterstate or noneconomic for the purposes of the Commerce Clause.
Carefully defining the applicability of the measure should avoid
the risk of the legislation being found to cover noninterstate activity
outside the scope of the Clause. The answer lies in precise drafting:
the federal preemptory measure contemplated by this Note must
apply only to organizations that engage in truly interstate consumer
data activities—a connection that Congress must be explicit in
142. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012) (holding Affordable
Care Act’s individual mandate impermissible under congressional Commerce Clause power
but constitutional under Congress’s taxing power).
143. Id. at 552 (reasoning that the individual mandate, which required individuals to
purchase health insurance, was not a regulation of existing economic activity nor interstate
in nature).
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 561-66.
147. Id. at 563 (upholding the mandate as an imposition of a tax under Congress’s taxing
power); see also Jody Freeman, What Amy Coney Barrett’s Confirmation Will Mean for Joe
Biden’s Climate Plan, VOX (Oct. 26, 2020, 10:18 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/ 21526207/amy-coney-barrett-senate-vote-environmental-law-biden-climate-plan
[https://perma.cc/3ERM-MUVY] (discussing Justice Barrett’s past praise of the Court’s
Commerce Clause analysis in ACA litigation).
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drawing legislatively. Purely local organizations should be excluded
from the measure’s coverage entirely, even if those organizations’
operations could theoretically fall under the Lopez exception for
local activities.148 Crucially, the exemption of 501(c)(3) organizations
from compliance with the federal legislation should similarly cover
only charitable entities whose data activities are properly understood as “interstate.”149
On the economic activity front, legislators have a safe harbor in
Supreme Court precedent. The Court has frequently applied “laws
regulating commerce to not-for-profit institutions,” upholding labor
measures, antitrust regulation, and more as applied to nonprofit
entities.150 In short, the “Commerce Clause is applicable to activities
undertaken without the intention of earning a profit”—and the
Court has found “no reason why the nonprofit character of an
enterprise should exclude it from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause.”151 It follows
that a measure regulating a commercial activity—the use of consumer data—could be applied to charitable organizations without
running afoul of the Supreme Court’s new focus on narrowing the
Commerce Clause.152
By carefully defining the scope of the federal preemptory measure
to avoid the now-controversial “local activities” exception to Lopez’s
Commerce Clause test, and through reliance on the Court’s own
jurisprudence in the area of nonprofit sector commercial regulation,
Congress could implement an omnibus preemptory consumer data
privacy measure that exempts charitable organizations from compliance.
C. Normative Concerns Support Federal Preemptory Action
Three normative arguments animate the case for a federal consumer data privacy measure that exempts charitable organizations.
The first, a public policy case, rests on the public good done by
148. But see Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 563.
149. See id.
150. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 584-85 (1997)
(summarizing applicability of commercial and economic regulations to nonprofit sector).
151. See id. at 584.
152. See id.
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501(c)(3) organizations and the centrality of their operations to
communities nationwide. The second case focuses on the lower
potential of abuse of the data privacy exemption by (c)(3) organizations compared to their (c)(4) counterparts. The third argument
maintains that the proper balance between the individual right to
data control and data processing entities’ survival lies in a measure
that exempts only “true” charitable organizations, 501(c)(3)
groups.153
1. Public Policy Favors Survival of 501(c)(3) Organizations
As the Smalltown Charity hypothetical illustrates, state-by-state
consumer data privacy regulation jeopardizes nonprofit organizations’ very survival. This problem is twofold. On one hand, the
applicability thresholds of some states’ privacy laws can capture
(c)(3) groups regardless of income level, requiring compliance from
even the tiniest of small-dollar organizations independent of their
geographic locations.154 On the other hand, the reality of (c)(3)
budgetary constraints often places professional compliance counsel
out of reach, which could cause these organizations to either comply
as a default strategy (wasting resources unnecessarily—recall the
Smalltowners) or to comply incorrectly (risking penalty).155
To reiterate the obvious from Part II of this Note (and via our
Smalltown friends), the current state regulatory scheme in place is
chaotic at best and impossibly contradictory at worst. Each measure
outlined in Part II of this Note defines “personal information” (or
“personal data”) differently.156 Each state law applies to a distinct
collection of organizations—whether for- or nonprofit—and exempts
a seemingly random set of entities.157 The affirmative duties required under each statute vary wildly, and threatened penalties
range from a proverbial slap on the wrist to a bankruptcy risk.158
With a lack of uniformity across the states, all organizations

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Introduction, note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
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struggle with compliance—not just charitable entities with limited
resources.
The challenges to good-faith compliance exist in the present state
patchwork system and will only grow as more and more jurisdictions inevitably add their own patches to the metaphorical
regulatory quilt.159 While data on nonprofit organizations—(c)(3) or
otherwise—that have been forced into bankruptcy on account of
consumer data privacy requirements or penalties is currently nonexistent, a comparison of the fines imposed for failed compliance
under the CCPA, VCDPA, and CPA against the average income
levels of 501(c)(3) groups reporting to the Internal Revenue Service
paints a clear mathematical picture: failure to comply with state
consumer data privacy law could prove fatal.160
To effectuate the underlying public policy rationale of federal
501(c)(3) tax exemption—that charitable and educational organizations represent a societal good that the government wishes to
encourage through the provision of a federal subsidy in the form of
a tax exemption—consumer data privacy law should be federalized
and crafted in a way that ensures 501(c)(3) survival. A federalized
data policy with a (c)(3) carve-out would ensure that the aim of
federal data privacy law as it pertains to 501(c)(3) organizations is
aligned with the aim of federal tax policy: charitable and educational organizations would no longer have to deal with state-bystate chaos and would instead be granted a federal subsidy to
ensure their continued survival.
In short, the “patchwork” of privacy measures currently in place
is no doubt “patchy” and certainly does not work for the entities
regulated. Creating a federal measure with a singular definition of
personal data, a uniform scope of applicability, predictable compliance requirements, and a consistent infraction scheme would benefit
all potentially regulated entities engaging in consumer data.

159. See Taylor Kay Lively, US State Privacy Legislation Tracker, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROS.
(Mar. 31, 2022), https://iapp.org/resources/article/us-state-privacy-legislation-tracker/ [https://
perma.cc/K6DN-V73H] (noting that as of August 11, 2022, twenty-seven states have
comprehensive privacy bills introduced, in committee, or on hold in the legislative process).
160. See supra Introduction, Part II.A.2-4.
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2. Constraints on (c)(3) Activities Strengthen Case
Resistance to a 501(c)(3) exemption in consumer data privacy law
is often presented in the form of a corruption or abuse concern—
that is, a worry that certain types of organizations being exempted
from a transparency-oriented policy will result in abuse of consumer
data for the furtherance of nefarious activities.161 This concern is
particularly acute with so-called “dark money” nonprofit organizations.162 “Dark money” groups are those that have wide discretion on
their advocacy, political, and electoral activities, and have little to
no corresponding disclosure obligations to governmental regulators.163 Exempting such organizations from yet another
transparency-oriented measure, so the argument goes, positions
nonprofit groups to exploit consumer data for political aims with
impunity and free of enforcable repercussions.
This concern is no doubt relevant to certain classifications of taxexempt entities but fundamentally misunderstands the constraints
already in place on 501(c)(3) activity. Organizations classified as
public charities under I.R.C. section 501(c)(3) are completely prohibited from engaging in electoral activity: they may not support or
oppose candidates for election, indirectly or directly, monetarily or
otherwise.164 501(c)(3)s are also heavily limited in their ability to
influence legislation, often called lobbying, and may not make
lobbying-related activity a “substantial part” of their operations.165
Violating either of these provisions is grounds for revocation of
exemption.166

161. This concern is generally more prevalent in the for-profit sector. Given the focus of this
Note, only the limited relevance of this concern to 501(c)(3) organizations will be discussed.
162. See Chisun Lee & Daniel I. Weiner, Dark Money, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/reform-money-politics/influence-big-money/dark-money
[https://perma.cc/Q9WH-HTG4] (providing overview of the over $1 billion spent in federal
elections since 2010, from 501(c)(4)-exempt groups and other disclosure-free organization
types).
163. See id.
164. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (defining permissible (c)(3) purposes and stating that such organizations must “not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign”).
165. Id. “No substantial part” has never been explicitly defined by the IRS. Note that
organizations classified as private foundations under section 501(c)(3) may not lobby at all.
See generally I.R.C. § 4945.
166. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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Combined with the overarching prohibition that the 501(c)(3)
business structure may not be used to generate net earnings for
private persons, these explicit lobbying and political prohibitions
substantially limit—if not entirely curb—the amount of data-driven
nefarious activity that 501(c)(3) organizations could conduct if exempted from a federalized data privacy measure.167 The behavioral
restraints operative in the federal tax code therefore counterbalance
the corruption concern that motivates some against a 501(c)(3)
consumer data privacy exemption.168
3. Balance of Individual Right vs. Nonprofit Existence
Exempting 501(c)(3) groups from compliance with a federalized
consumer data privacy measure properly balances the individual
right of control over personal data against the public good of
charitable and educational organizations encouraged by federal tax
policy.
A federalized policy without a 501(c)(3) exemption would swing
the privacy pendulum too far in favor of individual data control
rights at the expense of the nonprofit sector.169 As discussed in the
Introduction of this Note, leaving 501(c)(3) organizations caught in
the confusion of consumer data privacy compliance tangibly risks
the bankruptcy of charitable organizations for the vindication of
consumer data rights. By contrast, an exemption that captures all
federally tax-exempt entities (such as an exemption that extends to
trade associations and lobbying organizations) would improperly
weigh noncharitable groups’ business interests over individual
consumer data rights.170
The optimal balancing of these competing interests—the individual right to data privacy held by a consumer and the societal
interest in the continued existence of charitable and educational
167. See id.; supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text. The narrowness of the consumer data
privacy exemption serves as yet another barrier against abuse: 501(c)(4) organizations, the
archetypical “dark money” nonprofit structure, would be required to comply with the
hypothesized preemptory measure.
169. See generally supra Introduction (discussing hypothetical (c)(3) bankruptcy due to
consumer data privacy compliance).
170. See supra Part III.C.2.
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organizations—is found in exempting only 501(c)(3) organizations
from a federalized data privacy measure.171 The same public policy
rationales discussed in the Introduction and Part III.C.1 of this Note
do not apply to non-501(c)(3) exempt organizations because the
“public good” served by non-(c)(3)s (if it can be termed that at all) is
intrinsically different from the public good fostered by charitable
and educational entities.172 Without a greater societal good to justify an infringement on the individual right to data privacy,173 the
rationale for exempting any type of business structure from
compliance with a privacy measure falls away.174
The proper balance between individual and societal rights in a
comprehensive, preemptory federal consumer data privacy scheme
is therefore one that exempts solely 501(c)(3) organizations from
compliance.
IV. STATES DO NOT KNOW BEST
Three main counterarguments are likely to be proffered against
the idea of a federal omnibus consumer data privacy measure that
exempts 501(c)(3) organizations. The first two were dispelled by
Part III of this Note: the ideas that exempting 501(c)(3) organizations from compliance would (1) encourage corruption and (2) improperly favor societal good over individual rights do not hold water
when considered within the framework of existing tax code-imposed
behavioral constraints and the narrowness of the exemption being
proposed.175
The last argument against such a preemptory, exemptionproviding measure sounds a familiar refrain: the Tenth Amendment

171. See supra Part III.C.
172. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (exempting charitable and educational groups from
federal income tax), with, e.g., I.R.C. § 501(c)(6) (exempting trade associations from federal
income tax).
173. The “infringement” in this sense would be the exemption of a single type of entity from
compliance, effectively meaning there would be a business structure against which an
individual would not be able to vindicate their data rights.
174. But see supra Part III.C.1 (discussing societal good that underlies argument for
exempting 501(c)(3) organizations).
175. See supra Part III.C.2-3.
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and state expertise.176 With multiple states already stepping in with
comprehensive, high-quality consumer rights legislation, what good
would uniform federal action serve when faced with diverse consumer bodies nationwide? So the argument goes: it is an individual
state legislature’s prerogative to choose to exempt 501(c)(3) organizations from—or obligate them to ensure—consumer data privacy
compliance, and this policy directive should not be unilaterally
imposed on jurisdictions that have unique consumer needs—and
that are “closer” to the subjects of regulation when compared to the
federal government.
Like the case for federal preemptory action exempting 501(c)(3)s
outlined in Part III of this Note, this Tenth Amendment-esque
position is easily countered with a look at normative arguments that
dispense with state efficiency and expertise. First, the 501(c)(3)
income tax exemption is created and administered by the federal
government.177 It would maximize efficiency for charitable organizations that are recognized by the federal Internal Revenue Service to
have their privacy law exemption administered at the same governmental level.178
Second, the idea that states are more adept at regulating entities
in this area is strongly rebuffed by the number of revisions that
existing state law has already required before going into effect.179
For example, Virginia’s Act required the creation and review of a
special “Work Group” before the Act’s implementation in January
2023.180 The Group’s Final Report, generated over the course of six
meetings, recommended at least twelve concrete, nontrivial
revisions to the bill—including its definition of sensitive data, its
right to deletion, and its enforcement mechanisms—before the
measure is scheduled to take effect.181 These recommendations cut
at the substantive heart of the VCDPA and are emblematic of the
176. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. X (generally reserving powers not granted to the
federal government for the states).
177. See generally I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
178. Since the federal government maintains a database of 501(c)(3)-exempt organizations,
it would presumably be more straightforward for it to administer another statutory exemption
that hinges on this status compared to another governmental entity (such as a state).
179. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-581.2 (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (second passage).
180. VA. JOINT COMM’N ON TECH. & SCI. VA. CONSUMER DATA PROT. ACT WORK GRP., 2021
FINAL REPORT 1 (2021).
181. Id. at 2.
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greater pattern seen across state privacy legislative processes:
states simply do not possess the expertise to “get it right” on the
first time through.
In an area with such substantial compliance costs, “getting it
right”—up front, and not years later—is crucial.182 While states may
be effective laboratories of experimentation in other legislative
realms, in the world of privacy law, they are more akin to a mad
scientist’s lair, with a piecemeal policy more resembling Frankenstein’s monster than elegant creation.
Finally, states are not closer to their subjects of regulation, dataholding entities, in a way that often justifies state policy making
over federal regulation. Entities that are regulated by consumer
data privacy laws, whether for- or nonprofit, are inherently internet based and without borders.183 Unlike a local agricultural
industry (say, growing oranges), which constitutes a group of
businesses intrinsically tied to physical and state-based land,
internet-based businesses are no closer to a state’s government
than they are to the federal bureaucracy. While a state may have
more specialized knowledge to regulate the local citrus fruit
community by virtue of the orange groves being physically located
within state lines, the state does not possess the same localized,
innate knowledge when it comes to businesses operated in cyberspace.
The Tenth Amendment-style arguments against federal preemption are therefore not maintainable on either efficiency or expertise
grounds. When viewed in conjunction with the counterarguments
raised against and dispensed with for the 501(c)(3) exemption specifically, the strength of the proposed federal legislative solution
speaks for itself.
CONCLUSION
Congress should use its Commerce Clause power to pass a comprehensive, preemptory federal consumer data privacy measure that
explicitly exempts 501(c)(3) organizations from compliance. This
legislation would properly balance the public policy benefit achieved
182. See generally supra Introduction, Part I.
183. See, e.g., supra Introduction (discussing the Smalltowners).
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by the existence of 501(c)(3) organizations against the growing calls
for universal consumer data privacy rights and corresponding increased burden on nonprofit entities covered by states’ privacy
regimes.
Such a uniform system would mend the patchwork of the three
state measures currently in existence, under which each state implements a different scope of applicability, a unique compliance
requirement checklist, and varying enforcement mechanisms and
penalties. Given the current digital marketplace, in which even
small organizations are captured by differing privacy laws that
extend past state lines and into the ether, relegating this policy area
to the states is plainly inadequate for an increasingly online economy. As an indisputably commerce-oriented measure to govern the
entire United States economy, it is exclusively the province of the
federal legislature to institute a singular consumer data privacy
regime nationwide.
Charitable organizations exempt from federal income tax under
section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code ought to be exempt
from such a preemptory measure. The 501(c)(3) exemption is a
legislative recognition of the public good done by organizations
committed to charitable and educational missions. Simultaneously,
the nature of the 501(c)(3) regulations all but requires charitable
groups to deal in data for their continued existence. Unlike the forprofit world, charitable groups are less capable of following the prescriptions of the patchwork due to limited financial, personnel, and
technological resources—despite their being subject to the same
compliance obligations as profit-generating entities.
Congress—and the public at large—has a unique interest in sustaining the Smalltown Charities of America, in establishing a
federal omnibus consumer data privacy measure that excuses
501(c)(3)-exempt organizations from compliance.
Smalltown Charity could someday become Newtown Charity, a
successor organization situated in Big Country, a nation that has
passed a federal data measure with plain language that clearly
exempts Newtown Charity from compliance. Newtown Charity
would be able to continue operations until its mission is achieved:
Newtown has transitioned away from coal, its community is sustainably powered, and its people are well.
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While the loss of Smalltown Charity alone may appear as a singular missing square on the quilt of nonprofit organizations that
covers the country, the current system of state consumer data
privacy measures threatens to unravel this patchwork—that of
small-donor, big-impact charitable and educational organizations—
entirely.
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